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Of the multiple springs of modern economic growth, the emergence of scientific 
communities capable of focussing and validating inventive effort in the production of 
non-proprietary information bearing on the constitution of the material world is probably 
the least well-understood.
1  That development is commonly dated to between 1600 and 
1850, making it co-terminous with the fundamental scientific breakthroughs in 
mathematics and the physical sciences that laid the foundations for the second industrial 
revolution in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.  Thanks to several 
generations of historians of science, the intellectual history of those breakthroughs is 
fairly well understood.  Probably the most important generalization to be derived from 
that history is the remarkable degree to which non-empirical notions concerning the 
necesssary nature of reality affected the direction and interpretation of research.
2  In this 
respect, scientific invention differs fundamentally from technological invention, for 
which the the posing of problems and evaluation of solutions to them are more strongly 
influenced by considerations of practical utility.
3  Watt’s invention of the separate 
condenser might have been inspired by insights drawn from Black’s flawed caloric 
concept of heat; but the success of his steam engine ultimately depended on devising a 
workable disposition and regulation of  valves controlling the flow of steam, air, and 
water.  The connection between general systems of thought and scientific discovery thus 
highlights the intrinsically social character of scientific invention, in which resarch 
programmes and new findings are initially assessed on the basis of beliefs held within 
scientific communities.   
 
  David has recently drawn attention to the collective nature of science in his essay 
on the emergence of open science in the seventeenth and early eighteenth century.
4  He 
argues  that prior to the development of institutions inducing swift public disclosure of 
                                                 
1 This statement was drafted before I had a chance to read Paul David’s remarkable study ‘The historical 
origins of “Open Science”: an essay on patronage, reputation and common agency conracting in the 
Scientific Revolution,’ Capitalism and society 3 (2008), 1-103. (Berkeley Electronic Press) 
2 Although references to the vast bibliography are superfluous here, I draw the reader’s attention to the 
much overlooked work by John Theodore Merz, A history of European thought in the nineteenth century. 
Edinburgh and London (1907-1914), especially volumes I and II, and Ernst Mayer’s The growth of 
biological thought: diversity, evolution, and inheritance. Camridge MA: Belknap (1982). 
3 Vaucanson, named to the Académie des Sciences for his mechanical genius, complained to Trudaine in 
1765: 'The intelligent public will understand that it is much easier to make meteorological observations, or 
to stage demonstrations with ice, magnets or electricity, than to invent and construct a good machine  In the 
one case it is only a matter of explaining as one likes certain known effects; in the other one must produce 
new effects.  This is why the great majority direct themselves towards theory rather than practice.’ Cited by 
Briggs, ‘The Académie Royale des Sciences and the pursuit of utility,’ Past & Present 131 (1991), 84. 
 
4 David, ‘Historical origins’ 
  1new findings in order to make them available to other qualified scientists for validation 
(and reward), esoteric information was generally closely held as a proprietary good.  That 
hermeutic tradition, which in certain industrial crafts persisted into the nineteenth century 
(and survives today among acolytes of the political philosopher Leo Strauss), treated 
information as a ‘mystery’ to be guarded in the interest of maintaining market power and, 
in the imaginations of some thinkers, public order.  That tradition broke down in ‘pure’ 
science, in the face of its increasing esoterism, particularly marked in the mathematical 
branches, which made it difficult for potential patrons of scientists to judge their quality 
(and more importantly their reputation) without drawing on the expertise of the scientists 
themselves.  The critical historical element in this development was the interest of 
Renaissance princes in securing the services of reknowned scientists as a means of 
enhancing their prestige and (more hopefully) of securing some utilitarian benefit from 
their expertise.   David argues that Open Science was a consequence of the growing 
advantage to individual scientists seeking patronage of having their discoveries warranted 
by a community of peers rather than withholding them for a doubtful private gain, and to 
the increased willingness of patrons to accept the peers’ judgment in determining who 
and how much to fund.  The balance between disclosing and withholding information 
was a delicate one that remains difficult to sustain.  Nevertheless, by the second quarter 
of the eighteenth century, a transnational social network based on reciprocal disclosure of 
discoveries and collective warranting of their merits was in place.  Apart from the need to 
secure resources to fund research, the system functioned independently of the rest of 
society, elaborating and administering its rules of demonstration and rewards.  That 
independence, which as late as the middle of the seventeenth century was far from secure, 
is perhaps its greatest achievement.
5
 
The present paper deals with a different, though complementary issue.  For 
scientific investigation of the material world to produce significant and sustaining effects 
on productivity, the work had to be carried out on a scale large enough to breach the high 
threshhold of tested fact and theory required to support reliable generalizations covering 
phenomena characterized by high levels of complexity.  This was especially true of what 
might be called the ‘taxonomic’ sciences like natural history, minerology and chemistry, 
where most early work necessarily consisted in identifying and classifying phenomenal 
types.
6   Between 1780 and 1850 the scientific enterprise experienced a massive 
expansion in the number of distinct scientific disciplines and persons working at high 
levels of specialization.  The ‘scaling up’ of organized science, however, raised new 
problems of quality control and recruitment that the largely aristocratic and centralized 
institutions inherited from the seventeenth century were ill-suited to handle. As in the 
case of the emergence of ‘open science,’ resolution of these problems seems to have been 
an unintended by-product of other historical developments.  We often think of science as 
                                                 
5 That it was not complete is demonstrated by the government’s banning of Diderot’s Encyclopédie in 1759 
in response to the vigorous opposition of the religious authorities.  Darwin’s self-censorship in delaying 
publication of his theory of natural selection for much the same reason is another example.   
6 It was not by chance that the earliest scientific breakthroughs in theoretical physics were in optics and 
celestial mechanics, where contextual variation in the objects of observation was comparatively slight. 
Harvey’s discovery of the circulation of blood is another example.  Despite the complexity of the cardio-
vascular system, the structural relations between the heart, arteries and veins, and valves is the same across 
species, making it possible to draw generalizations from comparative anatomical investigations.  
  2an expression of Western culture; but what it expresses is not so much a general attitude 
towards the physical world, as a contingent outcome of events and institutional 
developments specific to the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century.  A review of 
that history reveals how unlikely that outcome was. 
 
Science as a Distinct Social System 
  Science has been defined by Ravetz as ‘the activity of investigating problems in 
the context of an abstract, technical discipline.’
7  To facilitate that investigation, scientists 
invent idiosyncratic languages in order to minimize ambiguity in transmitting and 
archiving information.
8  Conceptual work is largely dedicated to developing and refining 
such codes.
9  The resulting efficiency in communicating esoteric information, however, 
comes at the cost of heavy individual investment required to master the code, which 
creates a significant barrier to its diffusion to persons unable or unwilling to make the 
investment.
10  The specificity of scientific human capital has three major consequences 
for the organization of science.  The first is to impede the ability of lay persons to assess 
the potential scientific significance of  particulars line of enquiry, and thus to articulate an 
effective demand price for their product.
11  The second is to situate the maintenance of 
standards and recruitment of new scientists within the community of those who have 
mastered the codes.  The third consequence is the negative effect on recruitment of the 
cost and specificity of scientific human capital, for which there exist few alternative 
employment outside science.
12  Much work in science demands such high degrees of care 
and accuracy acquired as ‘tacit knowledge’ in learning by doing that  it is hard to delegate 
even simple tasks to semi-skilled personnel.
13  All these factors encourage the social 
autonomy of the scientific enterprise, at the cost of making the financing of scientific 
research problematic and assimilation of new concepts potentially contentious.
14
 
  Problems of validation and recruitment posed by the cost and specificity of 
scientific human capital are compounded by the coordination problem created by the 
                                                 
7 Jerome R. Ravetz, Scientific knowledge and its social problems. Oxford (1971),  
8 Jacob Marschak, ‘Economics of inquiring, communicating, deciding,’ AER Papers and Proceedings 
(1968), 1-18; Kenneth J. Arrow, The limits of organization. New York (1974), 37-43. 
9 The history of mathematical notation provides numerous examples, e.g., the development of a standard  
notation for matrix algebra at the turn of the twentieth century.  Much of the work of theoretical economics 
consists essentially in defining terms. 
10 The problem seems initially to have emerged in mathematics, where the development of algebra and the 
geometry of conic sections made the field increasingly inccessible to mathematicians’ potential patrons.  
See David, ‘Open Science’, 40. 
11 Kenneth Arrow, ‘Economic welfare and the allocation of resources for invention,’ in The rate and 
direction of inventive activity.  Princeton (1962), 609-25. 
12 The demand by financial institutions for ‘quants’ possessing advanced degrees in mathematical sciences 
is a spectacular exception.  The case of pharmacy as an outlet for trained chemists in the early nineteenth 
century is reviewed below. .   
13 Kollreuter’s field experiments in plant breeding were ruined because his workmen refused to follow his 
instructions to the letter.  Cf. Robert C. Olby, Origins of Mendelism. New York (1966), 24. 
14 The classical statement of discontinuous assimilation of new scientific concepts is Thomas S. Kuhn, The 
structure of scientific revolutions Chicago: University of Chicago Press (1962). 
  3absence of proprietary rights in scientific findings, which inhibits the use of markets to 
allocate scientific resources.  Despite their absence, the practice of science is   
nevertheless highly decentralized, and today occupies several million persons in 
thousands of sub-disciplines at sites dispersed throughout the world.  From an 
economist’s perspective, perhaps the most intriguing attribute of that decentralization is 
how research activity seems to track patterns that mimic what one would expect from 
optimizing individuals responding to price signals: a swarming into ‘hot’ fields, and 
abandonment of lines of research experiencing diminishing returns to effort.  It is hard to 
resist the conclusion that such patterns reflect the presence of a private property right in 
scientific output.  Sociologists of science locate that right in the collective recognition of 
priority of discovery.
15  Paid and protected by citations, policed by editorial boards and 
referees, that right supplies an objective which goes far to explain the intensity and 
obsessiveness of scientific effort and the waves of creative activity attending major 
breakthroughs in scientific concepts and experimental technique.
16  As a means of 
encouraging rapid exploitation of scientific opportunities, the development of scientific 
property rights has interesting analogies (and differences) with the evolution of laws and 
customs regulating mining claims in early California that attempted to strike a balance 
between protecting the original claim and allowing newcomers to try their luck on 
abandoned ones.
17  As Adam Smith observes in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, a man’s 
desire for approbation can lead him to undertake actions that together with similar actions 
taken by other men work like a ‘invisible hand’ to sustain civilized society.
18  Something 
similar sustains the economy of science.
19
 
Independently of psychological rewards, the cash surrender value of rights in first 
discovery can be significant.  In the first decades of the nineteenth century, Berthollet, 
Thénard, and Arago accumulated salaries equalling  the pay of high French civil servants, 
and Gay-Lussac’s income was truly princely.
20  Before 1850 German professors earned 
                                                 
15 For an insightful discussion of priority as a property right, see Robert K. Merton, ‘The ambivalence of 
the scientist,’ Bulletin of the Johns Hopkins Hospital 112 (1963), 77-97. 
16 The wave pattern of discovery is well documented.  Given a reward structure that permits a successful 
discoverer to secure a permanent income stream in a context of free entry, such waves are inevitable 
consequences of conceptual and experimental breakthroughs that alter the probability of individual success.  
For evidence of the waves, see Joseph Ben-David and Awraham Zlopczower, ‘Universities and academic 
systems in modern societies,’ European journal of sociology 3 (1962), 45-84, and Joseph Ben-David, 
‘Scientific productivity and academic organization in nineteenth-century medicine, American sociological 
review 25 (1960), 823-843.  On waves as the consequence of optimizing responses to opportunity, see 
Yoram Barzel, ‘Optimal timing of innovation,’ Review of economics and statistics 50 (1968), 348-55. 
17 Karen Clay and Gavin Wright, ‘Order without law? Property rights during the California gold rush,’ 
Explorations in economic history  42 (2005), 155-183.  
18 Smith, Theory of moral sentiments.  Page ref here. 
19 See David, ‘Origins of “Open Science”, 71-74, for an elegant game-theoretic account of the incentives 
supporting the institutions awarding property rights in discovery. 
20 Gay-Lussac, who was probably the best paid-scientist in the early nineteenth century, held several 
teaching positions and memberships on government boards, including the post of chief assayer to the mint.  
His annual income came to 55,000 francs.  Maurice Crosland, Gay-Lussac. Scientist and bourgeois. 
Cambridge (1978), 230. At the peak of his career Gak-Lussac’s colleague Thenard earned 30,000 francs 
and was made a peer of the realm by the July Monarchy.  Starting salaries for official positions were much 
lower, but a full professor at the Institut or the Museum  of Natural History received 5,000 to 6,000 francs, 
less than a sub-prefect, but respectable all the same.  Paul Gerbod, La condition universitaire en France au 
  4500 to 700 thalers, which was roughly equivalent to the annual revenue of modest 
burghers in port cities, but a talented and ambitious scientist like Justus Liebig was able 
to increase his university pay from 300 to 3,000 florins and the government subsidy for 
his laboratory from 100 to 1,500 florins.
21  Material incentives, then, are also present in 
the economy of science.  Yet instances of exceptional financial return from priority in 
discovery were winning tickets in a lottery that only a few scientific fields could support.  
Moreover, unlike in law, medicine and entertainment, cited by Adam Smith as examples 
where individuals’ over-estimation their ability induce an excess supply of candidates 
hoping to strike it rich, scientific work did not initially support a stock of low-paid jobs 
that could support aspirants hoping to hit the jackpot.  Scientific training was expensive 
and as noted above, its specificity made investing in it risky.  
 
The emergence of institutions defining and enforcing property rights in scientific 
discovery, then, was a necessary but not sufficient condition for the emergence of 
scientific research on a broad and ever-expanding front.  The development of an incentive 
system capable of supporting large-scale science proceeded in stages, the pieces being 
assembled piece by piece from existing elements of exsisting institutional arrangements.  
Resolution of the delicate informational problems posed by acts of doing, diffusing, and 
validating research on the frontier occurred in the first half of the nineteenth century, 
when scientific research came to be lodged in the university as part of the normal duties 
of professors, who recruited and trained new generations of scientists as a by-product of 
their teaching and research.  Given sufficient funding, the enterprise was self-sustaining 
and able readily to colonize new areas of research as they opened up.  It was de-
centralized, which in practice meant that in contrast to the earlier institutions of 
government-sponsored scientific acadenies, validation of establishment of priority in 
discovery were also decentralized.  The evaluation of scientific output was in turn linked 
to recruitment and promotion within the academic establishment, providing further 
material inducment to undertake sustained research.  By the third quarter of the 
nineteenth century, the scientific enterprise had acquired the institutional stability and 
independence from governmental and religious interference that would carry it into the 
second half of the twentieth century.
22 From an intellectual standpoint the Scientific 
Revolution takes its roots in the breakthroughs of the seventeenth century; from the 
institutional perspective, the Revolution belongs to the nineteenth. 
 
That the scientific enterprise should have lodged in what down to the 1840s were 
still essentially medieval institutions dedicated to training civil servants, priests, high 
school teachers, and a narrow range of medical professionals could not have been 
predicted in 1750.  Except for Eichorn’s seminar in biblical criticism at Göttingen, there 
                                                                                                                                                 
xix
e siècle.  Paris (1965); and Maurice Crosland, The Society of Arcueil. Cambridge (1967), 80, 133, 203, 
231. 
21 Charles E. McClelland, State, society and university in Germany, 17000-1914.  Cambridge (1980), 206-
211; J. B. Morrell, ‘The chemist breeders.  The research schools of Liebig and Thomas Johnson, Ambix 19 
(1972), 29-42. 
22 It is an important and as yet unresolved question whether this institutional framework for conducting 
science can survive the external pressures placed on it by the rising cost of research, which has led to calls 
for privatizing some of the product as a means of financing it, and the pressures placed upon the teaching 
establishment by demands for ever higher scientific production. 
  5were no academic venues for training students in advanced research methods, and no 
formal procedures for certifying their successful completiing of an independent research 
project.  Such science as was then conducted took place in private libraries and 
laboratories, and in the a handful of specialized institutes like the Jardin du Roi in Paris.  
Scientific analysis of ancient and medieval documents found institutional homes at the 
Benedictine Abbey of Saint-German-des-Prés and among the Jesuit Bollandists in 
Antwerp, but while monastic life supported disinterested study and the training of young 
researchers, lines of enquiry were confined in practice to the technical work of editing 
and criticizing manuscripts.  Mendel’s experiments on the transmission of inheritable 
traits in the garden of the Augustinian abbey at Brunn is a notable exception,  but as is 
well known, his revolutionary findings were ignored, possibly because he was so isolated 
from the scientific community.
23   
 
The one institution that possessed the capacity to provide advanced technical 
training was the craft guild, of which the medieval university was a distant cousin.  But 
by the eighteenth century guilds were protectionist and conservative, guarding their 
secrets closely.  But even had they been more open, the utilitarian focus and limited 
means of supporting apprentices inhibited any tendency to investigate and articulate the 
less appropriable general principles of their crafts.
24  Perhaps the greatest iimpediment to 
the development of science within the organizaitonal structure provided by the guilds, 
however, was lack of employment opportunities for trained researchers unable to support 
themselves by scientific research once they graduated.  This is, however, getting ahead of 
the story.  We must first consider the difficulties that any system of organized science had 
to resolve to be productive of new and secure findings. 
 
The Cognitive Constraint 
  Consideingr the obstacles to its institutionalization, the scaling up of open science 
in the nineteenth century was highly improbable.  As objects of exchange, scientific 
findings are characterized by their heterogeneity, uncertain reliability, and asymmetry in 
the distribution of information bearing on their validity and significance.  These features 
reflect the extreme specialization of research scientists induced by scale economies of 
learning by doing on the research frontier.  Behind that frontier, descriptive 
generalization and formal theory supply stable classes into which individual instances are 
fitted, interpreted, and understood; but across the no-man’s land dividing the known from 
the unknown, unvarnished fact reassert its individuality.  Initially ambiguous and 
indistinctly perceived, novel observations are hard to assimilate to known bodies of 
knowledge.   
 
                                                 
23 There is some evidence that his experiments were deliberately ignored. 
24  The instrument makers were a partial exception, as the work combined mathematics and craft skills of 
the highest level.  Their achievement, however, was embodied in physical instruments that were custom 
built for discerning clientele with the ability and willingness to pay.  For a major example, see Anita 
McConnell, Jesse Ramsden (1735-1800): London’s leading scientific instrument maker. Aldershot (2007). 
Note from briggs here. 
  6  The early history of astronomy provides an example of that ambiguity.   
Astronomers initially found it difficult to replicate observations because their lenses were 
ground from glass of variable quality.  Different telescopes ‘saw’ different things; even 
the same telescope might give different readings on different occasions.  Astronomers 
sometimes shipped lenses to other astronomers to have their observations confirmed 
using the same equipment; but it was often hard to determine whether the reported object 
was something in the sky or an artifact of an irregularity in the glass.  The problem 
occasioned bitter disputes, since the correspondent could claim that the initiating 
astronomer had seen something that was not there, while the initiator had a plausible 
claim that his correspondent was acting in bad faith.
25  Similar controversies disturbed 
the early history of microscopy.  What Alexander Pope’s quipped about literary criticism 
was just as true of contemporary science:  
 
‘Tis with our judgments as our watches, none  
Go just alike, yet each believes his own,’
26
 
The cognitive obstacles go beyond imperfect instrumentation, however.   
Observation and perception are not the same thing.  What a scientist ‘sees’ is 
phenomenal, an electro-chemical reaction to light striking the retina.  What he ‘perceives’ 
is that reaction simultaneously coded by neural circuits shaped by prior experience and 
theoretical constructs.  As Baudelaire beautifully put it, 
 
La nature est une temple où de vivants piliers 
Laissent parfois sortir de confuses paroles; 
L'homme y passe à travers des forêts de symboles 
Qui l'observent avec des regards familiers
27
 
As Ravetz observes, 
 
In any real situation, there are too many subtle cues and too many partly relevant 
precedents for the knowledge of how to cope with novelty to be reduced to tables 




Following a line of reasoning opened up by Wittgenstein, Hansen argues that 
observation is non-propositional.
29  When an observer ‘sees’ something, the immediate 
physical experience is organized (coded) by a context or gestalt supplied by his personal 
history, which in the case of a scientist includes his theoretical training and laboratory 
experience.
30  An observer sees the object ‘as’ something.  That first sighting is 
                                                 
25 Maurice Dumas, Les instruments scientifiques aux xvii
e et xviii
e siècles. Paris (1953), 42.   
26 An Essay on Criticism. 
27 ‘Correspondances’, Les fleurs du mal. 
28 Ravetz, Scientific knowledg, 102. 
29 Norwood Russell Hanson, Perception and discovery.  An introduction to scientific inquiry. San Francisco 
(1969). 
30 Hanson gives the example of a man who is ignorant of physics being introduced to a physics laboratory.  
He  ‘experiences’ the equipment as variously shaped objects attached by wires and tubes to other objects, 
  7idiosyncratic, as when a person sees a speck in the air as a duck rather than an airplane, or 
a star rather than an abberation in a telescopic lens.  The problem is that while 
circumstances can suggest meaning to the observer; their idiosyncracy can make it 
impossible for him to convey that perception in its raw state to others without further 
translation. The crucial cognitive step in science occurs when an ‘observation’ is asserted 
in the propositional logic of language, which makes the idiosyncratic first ‘sighting’ 
social.   
 
  The nature of perception as a gestalt  experience explains why the process of 
discocery is so difficult to codify.  The history of science is replete with examples of how 
difficult it is to establish a new fact, when that fact cannot be fitted easily into a formal 
frame of reference supporting a propositional description of it.  Edgar Anderson relates 
how a distinguished plant breeder failed to identify a new strain of maize because his 
statistical techniques did not capture its identifying characteristics. 
 
‘[T]he simple every day facts about the two strains were as follows.  The two sets 
were of quite a different shape.  One was broader and rounder at the base with a 
slight tendency to be wider in the middle, and it was nearly always shorter than 
the other. ...  Having seen half a dozen of each kind, one could classify at least 
nine out of twenty specimens which had been gathered by an assistant and 
brought in without a label. ... Taxonomists are more like artists than art critics.  
They practice their trade and don’t discuss it.  It was only by observing them 
trying to translate what they were doing ... that I made very much progress.  It 




  Probably the greatest failure of scientific perception  in the history of agricultural 
research stemmed from the inability of plant scientists to distinguish between 
saphrophytic and parasitic fungi at the time of the great potato blight in the 1840s.   
Incontrovertible evidence revealed that copper sulphate dressings inhibited the rot, but 
contemporary scientists ignored it because they believed that the fungal infestation was 
an effect and not the cause of the ‘sickness.’
32  Something was seen, but not perceived.  
Part of the difficulty was noisy data, a common phenomenon on the research frontier.  In 
South Wales the potato fields were largely free of the blight, because they were affected 
by fumes from a nearby copper smelter at Swansea.  But although the fumes killed the 
lethal spores, they also killed everything else.
33  Noisy data were not the only excuse for 
                                                                                                                                                 
and will describe them as such.  For him to see them the way a trained physicist sees them require his 
knowing what they are ‘for,’which implies his learning the physics.   The novice and the phsicist have the 
same retinal experience, but they ‘see’ different things. 
31 Edgar Anderson, Plants, man and life.  Boston (1952), 179-80. 
32 T. A. O’Neill, ‘The scientific investigation of the potato crop in Ireland, 1845-1846.,’ Irish historical 
studies 5 (1846-47), 123-138.  O’Neill claims that the discovery by Garrett Hughes, an Irish landowner, 
that steeping seed potatoes in the solution prevented the disease was dismissed by the scientific commission 
of inquiry into the causes of the blight because it didn’t make sense to them.  Hughes’ finding was not a 
singleton.  Other farmers made the same discovery.   
33P. M. Austin Bourke, ‘The scienhtific investigation of the potato blight in 1845-46,’ Irish historical 
studies 13 (1962), 26-32. 
  8scientific action, however.  A committee appointed by the British government to collect 
scientific evidence on the causes of the blight commissioned no experiments.  On any 
rational cost-benefit accounting the catastrophe warranted a huge investment.
34  A less 
momentous failure in perception was the Illinois Experiment Station’s abandonment of a 
promising programme of inbreeding of superior strains of corn because the research 
director did not believe what his assistants had seen – that crossing pure strains yielded 
significantly improved hibrid varieties.
35  Neither of these and other failures were owing 
to lack of raw data.  They reflect the difficulties of perception on the scientific frontier.  
As Hanson elegantly puts it, ‘There is more to seeing than meets the eyeball.’
36
 
  Although uncertainty described above occurs most frequently in empirical work, 
it also plagues non-experimental sciences.  Hagstrom reports a conversation with an 
eminent mathematician who confessed to him that 
 
I have never had a paper that wasn’t challenged.  I’ve never published a paper 
without a serious mistake and I never intend to do so.  A famous editor of a 
mathematical journal said the same thing as I have said about errors.  Papers 
without serious mistakes are probably trivial.  The work is too easy.’
37
 
In fields like mathematics sheer complexity creates obstacles to understanding.  When a 
Japanese mathematician ‘solved’ Poincaré’s conjecture in a one hundred page proof, 
nobody believed it, even though no one could find an error it.
38
 
  The above examples illustrate the primary obstacle to decentralized science:  the 
information costs imposed by the idiosyncracy of novel findings.   In considering why 
markets tend to underprovide scientific output, most economists emphasize the public 
goods nature of scientific information.  From this perspective the main contractual 
problem is organizing the purchasers.
39   The cognitive problem raised above, however, 
is more fundamental.  Collective goods can be collectively purchased by their joint 
consumers; but collective purchase of scientific information through, say, publically 
funded agricultural experiment stations, has no particular implication for the quality of 
the findings purchased.  The history of ‘commissioned’ science in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth century is fraught with failures resulting from the inability of scientific patrons 
to distinguish good work from bad.  None of the famous names in eighteenth-century 
invention appear in the list of prize-winners awarded by the Royal Society of Arts, which 
was expressly established to encourage invention.
40  Prizes were awarded for false 
                                                 
34 Mokyr estimates that that neglet cost between one and one and a half million excess deaths.  Joel Mokyr, 
‘The deadly fungus: an econometric investigation into the short-run demographic impact of the Irish 
famine, 1846-19851,’ Research in population economics 2 (1980), 237-77 
35 Richard A. Crabb, The hybrid-corn makers.  Prophets of Plenty. New Brunswick (1947)  
36 Norwood Russell Hanson, Patterns of Discovery. Cambridge (1972), 7. 
37 Warren O. Hagstrom, The scientific community. New York and London (1965), 27. 
38 Hagstrom, Loc. cit. 
39 Arrow, ‘Economic welfare.’   
40 Henry Trueman Wood, A history of the Royal Society of Arts. London (1913), 240-43.  The French 
Académie des Sciences and later the Institut were also slow to credit important inventions, usually on the 
grounds that they were insufficiently original.  Leblanc never received the prize set in 1783 for the method 
  9solutions and withheld from inventors making promising but incomplete advances to the 
solution of a problem.  In 1846 the Royal Agricultural Society awarded a prize to a man 
who claimed that the potato blight was caused by the unhealthiness of the plants, though 
any such finding could only be defended by a terribly flawed experimental design.
41
 
  Demand for information alone, then, was insufficient support for good scientific 
work.  This is well brought out by the history of agricultural experimentation.  There was 
obvious and strong demand for an agricultural science from at least the time Francis 
Bacon was steeping wheat seeds in Malmsey to see if the liquor inhibited smut, but the 
search for a way to increase crop yields was undirected by hypothesis.  In light of the 
number of factors bearing on plant growth, it is hardly surprising that thousands of early 
‘ t r i a l s ’  f a i l e d  t o  t u r n  u p  anything significant.   Imprecise measurement and lack of 
controls limited the usefulness and impeded the replication of field and other 
experiments.  Moreover, eighteenth-century sponsors of agricultural research were more 
interested in assessing costs of different methods cultivation than in uncovering 
biological processes determining plant and animal yields, and they treated experimental 
farms more as demonstration stations than as experiment stations.  It was in that spirit 
that the Royal Dublin Society ordered John Wynn Baker to discontinue investigation into 
how row cultivation affected the yields of different varieties of wheat, and to get on with 
task of demonstrating the profitability of the ‘new’ system of husbandry propagandized 
by Arthur Young.
42  For his part, owing to lack of control plots, Young’s undisciplined 
enthusiasm for the ‘system’ was reflected in the failure of his more than 2,000 field 
‘trials’ to yield any useful information.
43  
 
It took persons trained in scientific method to appreciate the crucial importance of 
experimental controls.  The need to design agricultural field experiments controlling for 
factors other than the one under investigation was not generally appreciated until the 
1840s, when the appearance of costly concentrated fertilizers created a demand for 
accurate information on their effects.  The improvement in experimental design was 
largely due to the incursion of scientists from organic chemistry recruited to test the 
effect of fertilizers on crops planted in different soil types and subject to different 
rotations.  As Daubeny remarked in his address to the Royal Agricultural Society in 1841, 
any real addition to knowledge had to come from men trained in ‘proper methods of 
experimenting’ and not from laymen conducting trials in an ‘unscientific manner.’
44  The 
founding of the first agricultural experiment stations in Germany was largely a response 
                                                                                                                                                 
of obtaining salt from soda that is named after him.  Philippe de Gérard’s claim for the million franc prize 
offered by Napoleon for a machine to spin flax was rejected because his (successful) design was deemed 
too simple.  Maurice Crosland, The society of Arcueil. Cambridge, MA (1967), 27, 31. 
41 E. C. Large, The advance of the fungi. London (1938), 28. 
42 Arthur Young supported the Society on the grounds that the farm had been set up to demonstrate the new 
husbandry, not as a place where Baker could acquire knowledge and a scientific reputation at the Society’s 
expense.  George E. Fussell, ‘John Wynn Baker: An “Improver” in eighteenth-century Ireland,’ 
Agricultural history 5  (1931), 151-61. 
43 G. E. Fussell, ‘The technique of early field experiements, ‘Journal of the Royal Agricultural Society of 
England 56 (1935), 82. 
44 Charles Daubeny, ‘Lecture on the application of science to ariculture,’ Journal of the Royal Agricultural 
Society 3 (1842), 137-38.  See also E. M. Crowther, ‘The technique of modern farm experiments,’ Ibid. 97 
(1936), 54-57. 
  10by professional chemists to the failures of such non-professional experimenting.
45  The 
institutional innovation consisted in transferring not just the experimental technique, but 
the adapting the institutional form and ethos of organized science to agricultural 
research.
46  The form, if not the ethos, however, was of recent parentage. 
 
The Identity Solution to the Cognitive Constraint 
 
  Where products are non-standard and quality uncertain, decentralized supply often 
induces specialization by identity.  This is most evident in the last redoubt of non-
commercial supply, family provision of emotional support for children and aged 
relatives, where the person providing the service is in large measure the service.
47   
Knowing the supplier lowers the cost of search on the buyer’s side, and provides the 
supplier an incentive to maintain the quality of his product.  Reducing ‘acquisition cost’ 
and providing incentives for high quality was especially critical to the early development 
of organized science, because the geographic dispersion of researchers, the highly 
specialized nature of their work and findings, and the slowness of communications meant 
that experiments could not be immediately verified.  Yet, they could not be taken on 
faith, either.  The French Académie des Sciences attempted to resolve the problem by 
centralizing the deposit of research findings in one place, where they could be discussed 
and evaluated by the members sitting as a committee of the whole.  But despite its 
preference for ‘collective’ science, the Académie was forced to abandon the reception of 
anonymous contributions, because it was impossible to verify all experiments before the 
entire Company assembled at its premises in the Bibliothèque du Roi.  Identifying the 
author of a research reports was accepted as a necessary, though inferior, guarantee of its 
quality.
48   Names mattered. 
 
  Non-anonymity in scientific work hardly surprising.  Scientists publish their work 
under their own name because unassigned discovery supports no claim to priority, or at 
best supports a posthumous claim.
49  Scientists not only refuse to submit unsigned 
papers, but generally reject unsigned work.  Identification encourages scientists to signal 
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optimization of an individual utility function and the market demand curve.  He died a broken man when 
his book was ignored, and when his work was recognized by Jevons, his publisher pasted a new page on the 
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  11their quality by giving emblems of good performance, which include crediting the 
contributions of others, fully describing the data and methods of analysis, and cautiously 
interpretating results.  These elements of scientific style give an assurance of reliability.  
Attaching one’s name to a discovery also accumulates reputational capital.  A scientist 
whose work has proved reliable and useful in the past will find it easier to get his work 
accepted than a novice without a track record.  There is a certain economic logic to this, 
as the informational cost of using new work by a known scientist is lower than using that 
of one who is untested.  As in other spheres of social life, science has its hierarchies.
50   
 
Scientific reputation, then, is a form of human capital.  But exactly who is 
invested?  The technical codes used to communicate specialized scientific work mean 
that only insiders can accurately judge the value of a particular research finding and thus 
create and validate a scientific reputation.  The producers and immediate consumers of 
specialized research are thus mutually invested.  The persons who ‘recognize’ priority 
must be as specialized in the particular field as the discoverer.  It is in this sense that 
scientific communities resemble families: knowledge generated about scientific work of 
individuals is personal knowledge. 
 
An economic explanation of the organization of scientific activity, therefore, 
would predict that it typically take the form of small groups of persons within which 
scientific communication is intense.  The cost of acquiring and maintaining the stock of 
individual reputational information probably explains their small size.  Members of what 
have been called ‘invisible colleges’ may be thought of as making person-specific 
investments in each other’s work, acquiring in the process a specific capital that allows 
them to communicate with each other at low cost.  Within the economy defined by that 
cost, individual scientists are linked by an implicit contract enforced through mutual 
monitoring of performance.  The invisible college thus functions like a caste system.
51  
Within the community, honest mistakes are not penalized unless they become habitual.
52  
Sociologists of science report that scientists working outside established groups tend to 
be relatively unproductive, and that research tends be repetitive and unoriginal in their 
                                                 
50 One of Hagstrom’s informants told him that in the early stages of his career, he deliberately delayed 
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good will was more important to me than priority.’ Hagstrom, Scientific community, 91.  
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52 The historian J. H. Hexter observed in this connection that ‘In every discipline the askers of easy 
questions come up regularly with easy answers, and the askeers of hard questions often fumble and miss.  
And in every discipline the practioners are rated not by a mere count of the number of uesitons they 
answered correctly, but by a corporate judgement of how hard the question was, how much worth 
answering, and how good a try the practioner made in trying to answer it.’  J. Hexter, The history primer.  
New York (1971). 
  12absence.
53  The coagulation of scientific activity into small clots of specialists can thus be 
interpreted as a solution to the problem of assigning priority. Given the cognitive 
uncertainty attaching to truly new findings and the temptation to cheat, it is difficult to 
conceive a method of monitoring and rewarding good work in science that did not depend 
on review by qualified peers.
54   
 
The monitoring and evaluation of scientific output is related to the problem of 
creating incentives assuring continuous effort.  For science to develop on a wide base, it 
could not continue to rest on a small number of wealthy persons supporting themselves in 
a life of research.  The growth of organized science thus implied an institutional structure 
in which researchers are salaried.  The problems of institutional design in this context are 
illuminated by the older literature on optimal labour contracts.
55  Wage structures that 
discriminate among workers based on performance induce employees to reveal their 
ability, but are only feasible if performance can be effectively monitored, and even where 
accurate monitoring is feasible, the high risk of failure in scientific research implies that 
even well-calibrated wage scales are unlikely to induce an optimal supply of potentially 
able scientists.  It thus necessary to insure researchers against failure by paying a wage 
unrelated to their productivity.   But any contract of this kind creates a moral hazard that 
once tenured, a worker will slack off.   To overcome that risk, information about an 
individual’s traits and likely productivity must be acquired through screening.  The 
problems of institutional science resulting from the uncertainty of findings on the 
research frontier thus extend to recruiting a stable and productive labour force.   These 
remarks illustrate the delicacy of the contractual problems engaged in establishing an 
institutional form for supporting a science that did not depend on the work of wealthy 
amateurs. 
 
The Evolution of Scientific Contracts
56
 
  We can now examine the evolutionary path of the institutional forms regulating 
recruitment, rewards, and mutual surveillance of scientists in the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth century.  The above discussion suggests that the key elements of effective 
scientific organization are peer review, and a reward system controlled by persons 
capable of assessing scientific performance.  The hypothesis advanced below is that an 
institutional form capable of resolving these issues and providing a means by which 
talented young researchers could signal their ability did not emerge full-blown, but came 
together like the pieces of a puzzle in a sequence of events largely determined by the 
difficulty of securing necessarily implicit contracting arrangements.  An economic 
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  13approach to this question would posit that the contracts having the highest net value 
would be the most likely to have been invented first.  Yet, before the middle decades of 
the nineteenth century, by which time the basic institutional form assumed by science 
was in place, the market demand for scientific output was limited.  It is thus plausible to 
look for explanations of the institutionalization on the supply side, in changes affecting 
the cost of organizing the work, rather than changes in its perceived value.
57
 
  Of the solutions, peer review was the first to be achieved, because it depended on 
little more than the natural desire to publish one’s discoveries to the world.  The critical 
barrier was the cost of communication.
58  Recruiting scientists from beyond the ranks of 
the leisured curious was more difficult, because it required finding a way of identifying 
and encouraging young scientists without giving them so much security that they ceased 
to be productive.  Most difficult of all was developing pay and employment structures 
rewarding scientific performance in rough proportion to scientific contribution.  Because 
the reward system required effective monitoring, the review system had to be in place 
first.  The reward and signalling system had to be in place to before it was possible recruit 
new generations of scientists from non-wealthy backgrounds.  When all the pieces were 
in place a science capable of expanding and employing large numbers of men and women 
in specialized pursuits could emerge.  There was nothing, however, to ensure that 
solutions should be found just when the social benefit exceeded  their cost.  Just because 




  Students of science and invention agree that the instant of discovery is one of 
intense emotional excitement, when nature seems to speak directly to the discoverer.  But 
the moment is personal.  As Adam Smith observes,  we do not experience another 
person’s tooth-ache.  The desire to publish findings is largely motivated by the need to 
have one’s vision validated by the approval of persons competent to judge.  Darwin 
confessed in his Autobiography that 
 
‘I believe that I can say with truth that in after years, though I cared in the highest 
degree for the approbation of such men as Lyell and Hooker, who were my 
friends, I did not care much about the general public.  I do not mean to say that a 
favourable review or a large sale of my books did not please me greatly, but the 
pleasure was a fleeting one, and I am sure that I have never turned one inch out of 
my course to gain fame.’
59
 
The audience is the peer group.  Scientific peer groups emerged as soon as there were 
men possessed of the means and leisure to investigate nature, and the desire to publish 
their findings to others.  Their appearance was a natural consequence of scale economies 
                                                 
57 As always, there are exceptions.  The usefulness of geology in locating mineral deposits was recognized 
by the 1830s, which induced significant public support for training and employing geologists.. 
58 For a persuasive alternative view that focuses on incentives that emerged from problems associated with 
the patronage system, see David, ‘Historical origins.’ 
59 Cited in Hans Selye, From dream to discovery.  New York (1964), 13-14. 
  14in acquiring knowledge on the research frontier.  As the number of persons interested and 
engaged in science increased, such groups emerged wherever the cost of communicating 
findings was not prohibitive.
60   
 
The initial institutional solution was to place the validation of scientific findings 
in an authorized company of scientists sitting as judges. This centralization of the 
function reflected a view that since science is a collective enterprise, assignment of 
priority in discovery ought to be carried out collectively.  In was in that spirit that 
seventeenth-century scientific societies published findings under their collective name, on 
the grounds that after prolonged discussion, it was often difficult (as it still is) to 
disentangle individual contributions to a particular scientific result.  An assembly of 
persons having broadly similar interests in a subject, however, does not guarantee 
effective judgment.  Samuel Goodenough, an authority on seaweeds, complained of the 
Society for Promoting Natural History that 
 
‘[T]he present Society goes on in the usual way of having a fossil or a plant go 
round the table; nothing is or can be said about it.  It is referred to a committee to 
reconsider: the committee call it by some name and send it back to the society.  
The society desires the committee to reconsider it.  In the meantime nothing is 
done; indeed it does not appear to me that any of them can do anything.’
61
 
In France the system broke down when more and more experiments came to be 
conducted off the Academy’s premises.
62  Even after anonymity of contributions was 
abandoned, however, members of the Académie  were forbidden from attaching their 
name to new work until it had been cleared by the entire company.  Specialization by 
identity thus came about in part because of the physical impossibility of concentrating 
specialists and conducting experiments in one place.  But decentralizing verification 
required an efficient medium of scientific communication. 
 
Letters and Periodicals 
 
Prior to the late eighteenth-century the cost of publishing scientific journals for 
the small audiences that could effectively use them was too high for them to function as a 
medium for diffusing and evaluating scientific findings.   With minor exceptions, there 
does not seem to have been any significant decline in the cost of publishing periodicals 
between 1600 and 1800.  The presses and methods technique of printing hardly changed, 
while the cost of paper, which was the most expensive variable input, remained high.
63  
                                                 
60 The attentive reader will note that this account differs fundamentally from that advanced by David, who 
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61 Cited in Harold R. Fletcher, The story of the Royal Horticultural Society, 1804-1848.  Oxford (1969), 26. 
62 Roger Hahn, The anatomy of a scientific institution.  The Paris Academy of Sciences, 1666-1803. 
Berkeley (1971), 24-29. 
63 For an extensive collection data on periodical publishing costs in Germany in the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth century, see Joachim Kirchner, Das deutsche Zeitschriftswesen, Bd. 2.  Weisbaden (1958-1962), 
430-472, and Walter Krieg, Materielen zu einer Entwicklungsgeschicte der Bucherpreise. Wien (1953). 
  15Scientific publications were costly.  In the 1790s the Annales de Chimie, which was 
subsidized by the French State, cost 12 francs at a time when the daily wage was less than 
one.
64  The cost of engraving publishing in descriptive sciences like natural history 
prohibitive.  In 1817 Royal Horticultural Society spent more than £3,000 to print its 
Transactions, which sold at over twice a English workingman’s  weekly wage.
65   
 
  Journals, then, were not the preferred method of communicating scientific 
findings too brief to be written up as a book.  Instead, scientists relied on personal 
correspondence, often formally written up.
66  Circulating in manuscript form, scientific 
letters served to announce and discuss new findings.  By the middle of the seventeenth 
century their volume had grown to a point that warranted the emergence of clearing 
houses, a task performed by Père Mersenne and Ismaël Boulliau in Paris and Henry 
Oldenburg in London.
67  Among the advantages of correspondence was freedom from the 
pervasive censorship to which printed material was then subject.  The volume of 
correspondence, however, soon became immense, though no one seems to have matched 
the output of the Italian humanist Fabri de Pereisc, who is said to have had more than 500 
correspondents and once wrote 42 letters in a single day.
68  These networks of scientific 
correspondence did not originate in the scientific community, however. Epistolary 
diffusion of insights and findings to selected correspondents goes back at least to 
Petrarch.  Early scientists thus had no need to invent a new means of communication.  
They borrowed the technique from the the international literary community, and well into 
the seventeenth century shared the same networks of correspondence. 
 
 The  French Académie des Sciences tried to short-circuit these private and 
uncontrollable networks by centralizing the communication of scientific findings in its 
transactions,  but publication was so slow the material was dated by the time it appeared 
in print.  Personal correspondence thus remained the preferred method for establishing 
priority in discovery into the early eighteenth century.
69  The first ‘learned’ journals thus 
played a modest role in sifting and diffusing scientific discoveries, and used more as 
digest to be browsed by persons preparing to attend a salon than serious venues for 
research.  As the editor of the Journal des Sçavans, the official organ of the Académie des 
Inscriptions, complained 
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  16‘Journals have been invented for the relief of those either too indolent or too 
occupied to read whole books.  It is a means of satisfying curiosity and becoming 
learned with little trouble.’
70  
 
If the transactons of scientific academies did not perform the function of screening 
scientific production, the same was true of the non-official periodicals which first 
appeared in Germany during the first half of the eighteenth century.  Published by 
booksellers, they aimed at a wide readership and were therefore printed in large runs.
71  
Not surprisingly their mortality rate was high.  Of the 167 learned German periodicals 
founded before 1716, 36 percent died in the first year, and only 5 percent survived five 
years.
72  The high mortality persisted through the first two thirds of the century, despite 
or perhaps because of the growth in the number of periodicals published.  The main 
reason was their unspecialized readership.  At a time when the number of competent 
specialists in individual scientific fields probably did not exceed two or three dozen 
persons, periodicals published for profit were poor vehicles for disseminating original 
scientific findings.  Unlike the Transactions of officially sponsored scientific societies, 
contributions to the early scientific journals were not refereed beyond the minimal level 
needed to avoid censorship.  Always short of material, editors accepted or translated what 
they could get their hands on.
73   German periodicals are perhaps unique in that the states 
subsidized publication for the benefit of their gelehrten, and circulation was mainly local.  
Although they served a valuable function in republishing foreign work and popularizing 
science among educated people, they could not serve as true scientific journals, which 
demanded editing by scientists.
74
The first professional journal to accept original scientific findings date to the 
1770s, with the Abbé Rozier’s Observation sur le physique (1771), and the series of 
chemical journals initiated in 1778 by Lorenz von Crell, who had studied under Black at 
Glasgow.
75  They were nevertheless edited by amateurs.  The title of one of Crell’s 
periodicals gives a good idea of the audience to whom it was intended: Chemische 
annalen für die Freunde der Naturlehre, Arzneigelehrheit, Haushaltkunst und 
Manufacturen.
76  The first scientific journal controlled by professional scientists was the 
Annales de chimie (1790), whose editorial board included Fourcroy, Lavoisier, Guyton de 
Morveau, and Berthollet.
77  T h e  Annales was a special case precipitated by the 
Revolution.  Elsewhere, the editorship of learned journals tended to stay in the hands of 
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  17interested amateurs.  It was only in the second quarter of the nineteenth century that 
editorial control passed irrevocably to professional scientists. 
The passage was not peaceful.  Justus Liebig’s transformation of a sleepy north 
German pharmaceutical periodical into the leading chemical journal of its day was little 
short of a coup.  Periodicals reporting pharmaceutical and medical findings had appeared 
in the 1780s to keep pharmacists and physicians abreast of the latest developments in 
chemistry.  They were essentially newsletters published by professional associations 
featuring news of interest to pharmacists and describing new drugs and methods of 
preparing them.  Liebig, who ’for the sake of the money involved’ agreed to co-edit the 
Magazin für Pharmazie und die dahin einschlagenden Wissenschaften installed the new 
regime by subjecting all chemical findings to criticism and as far as possible to 
verification.  He renamed the journal the Annalen der Chemie.   The innovation led to 
disputes with his coeditor, who quit the enterprise to found his own journal.  In the first 
five years of his editorship, Liebig edited the Annalen with the help of pharmacists 
teaching in other universities or academies, who in effect served as referees.  In 1837 he 
acquired total control of the journal and secured the services of Dumas and Thomas 
Graham, making it the most powerfully edited scientific journal of its time.
78   Despite 
this, the Annalen’s distribution was uneven.  As late as 1841 his German colleague 
Robert Bunsen was unaware of it.
79
Although peer review continued to function on the basis of letters and books 
circulating among scholars and scientists, down to the early nineteenth century its 
supreme institutional expression remained the scientific academy, where material 
rewards, status and the opportunity for intense discussion with experts supplied a 
powerful mechanism for screening and publicizing new findings.  The effectiveness of 
that institutional arrangement depended on the quality of the members, and between the 
last quarter of the eighteenth century  and the first two decades of the nineteenth the 
French  Académie  and its successor the Institut  assembled a company of scientific 
geniuses that has rarely if ever been equalled.  Writing to Lakanel in the summer of 1793, 
Lavoisier pleaded with the member of the Convention to save the Académie des Sciences 
to reserve subsidized positions for professional scientists.  The belles lettres, he wrote, 
can survive on reading and personal experience.  ‘Il n’en est pas de même dans les 
sciences: la plupart ne peuvent être cultivée avec succès par les individus isolés.  Il faut 
une réunion d’effort.’
80  When qualified men assemble to hear and criticize new work, ‘il 
en résulte une véritable sanction sans laquelle elles inspiraient moins de confiance.’
81   
The signature of the Secretary of the First Class of the Institut, which was the successor 
to the Académie, constituted the seal of authentication for major discoveries; on occasion 
the Institut sat as a court to determine local priority.
82
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  Nevertheless, there were limits to what could be achieved through centralization.  
Already by the first decade of the nineteenth century the scientists were complaining that 
meetings had ceased to be scientifically useful because members lacked the specialized 
knowledge needed to judge and criticize topics presented to them, and because ‘real’ 
work was being conducted and published elsewhere.  A committee composed of 
Fourcroy, LaPlace, Cuvier, Lacépede, and Legendre observed that  
 
‘today so much of science is so specialized that it cannot enter into a general 
education, and the most highly educated man does not understand what is said 
unless he has devoted himself to that particular subject.’
83
 
The substitution of periodicals for correspondence networks and scientific 
academies as the locus of validation of scientific work raised other barriers to the 
assessment and diffusion of scientific information, however.   I have already noted 
Bunsen’s ignorance of Liebig’s Annalen. The Cambridge botanist James Henslow 
complained in 1841 to the Royal Agriculture that it was impossible to keep up with 
continental work on diseases in wheat because the University library didn’t carry the 
relevant books and journals.
84  Jacob Schleiden, one of the cofounders of the cell theory, 
was ignorant of the micrroscopic work by mycologists on spores, and thought that they 
were were diseased cells.  Liebig thought blights were caused by bad sap.
85  As scientific 
journalism became more specialized and more professional, the quality of the work 
improved, but its audience narrowed. 
 
  Scientific journalism nevertheless benefitted in the 1820s from the decline in the 
cost of printing resulting from the invention of lithography and the steam press.  This was 
especially important for natural history, where graphical description is crucial to 
taxonomic identification.  Before the fall in cost, such books were so dear they were 
accessible only to gentleman scholars.
86  Yet on the whole, declining printing cost played 
a modest role in the development of decentralized peer review rooted in the editorial 
boards of scientific journals.  The primary force driving that development was simple 
increase in the number of practitioners and the proliferation of specialized scientific 
languages. Given the innate psychological need for approbation by scientific peers, 
simple growth in the numbers of scientists (and the number of sciences) seems to have 
been sufficient once scientists gained control of the publishing apparatus. 
 
Solving The Problem of Recruitment 
 
While networks of corresponding scientists reduced the transaction cost of 
monitoring scientific output, they did little to encourage individual investment in the 
long-lived risk-prone human capital producing it.   Given the specificity of that capital, 
prospective investors needed assurance of a steady and profitable return.  For their part, 
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  19the purchasers of the services of that capital needed assurance of its productivity  The 
recruitment of scientists thus raised  signalling problems on both sides of the market for 
specialized scientific skill.  In the absence of institutions producing reliable signals of 
stable employment in scientific careers, investment in scientific human capital would 
have been restricted to the well-off or the exceptionally dedicated.  Darwin is a good 
example of the former; the co-discoverer of the principle of natural selection, Alfred 
Wallace, is an example of the latter.
87   The emergence of a large scientific community 
needed a broader base. 
 
Scientific academies were not well suited to that role.  As elite institutions whose 
entry was awarded as an honour, membership was generally poorly rewarded – stipends 
in eighteenth-century France were at best two-thirds of a comfortable middle-class 
income.  Moreover, a scientist entered the Academy only after he had made his 
reputation.  As a means of recruiting and supporting young talent, then, Academies 
established to promote science were a catch-22.
88  In the course of the eighteenth and 
early nineteenth century the pool of scientific talent was deepened in two ways  The first 
drew on the traditional method of patronage, which exploited person-specific 
information.  The second resulted from growing demand for skills that involved formal 
scientific training, which created a derived demand for science teachers and a joint supply 
of potential scientists.  When the two combined in the École polytechnique in the first 
two decades of the nineteenth century, powerful mechanisms for screening and 
supporting young scientists were brought into play.   
 
As a mechanism for recruiting scientists the traditional system of aristocratic 
patronage of promising young men was an effective means of acquiring information 
about their talent and giving them a loose expectation based on future performance.  The 
drawback was that patronage depended in significant measure on chance encounter, was 
limited to relatively small numbers of recruits, and was spread across the whole range of 
literary and scientific fields.   Crosland’s history of the Society of Arcueil illustrates the 
changing patterns of patronage in the late eighteenth century.  When Berthollet arrived in 
Paris in 1772, he secured an introduction to the Duke of Orléans, who in turn 
recommended him to Madame de Montesson as her personal physician, a post giving him 
enough income and time to conduct chemical research in his own laboratory.   His 
contemporary Fourcroy was the son of an apothecary in the Duke’s household.  Vicq-
d’Azyr, inventor of comparative anatomy, owed his ascent to the friendship of Condorcet 
and Turgot.  In the decades preceding the Revolution, however, the source of patronage 
shifted to prominent scientists.  Vauquelin got his entry through a letter of introduction 
from Fourcroy; Thénard got admitted to Fourcroy’s laboratory through the intercession of 
Fourcroy’s sisters. In the 1790s and early 1800s Arago, Poisson, and Gay-Lussac were 
recruited by competition among already highly selected students at the École 
polytechnique for minor teaching positions, where they distinguished themselves before 
their illustrious teachers.  Posted to Beauvais to teach mathematics in a lycée, Biot 
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  20secured Laplace’s patronage by offering to correct the proofs of the great man’s 
Mécanique céleste.
89    
 
Probably the most prominent patron at the turn of the nineteenth century was 
Alexander von Humboldt, who identified the talent of the young Justus Liebig and 
secured his entry to Gay-Lussac’s laboratory.  He then secured the Hessian government 
to create a post of extraordinary professor for him at Giessen.  Ten years later,l he met 
and encouraged the young Boussingault, one of the discoverers of the nitrogen cycle, and 
was off to Bogota for ten years to set up a school of engineering and study volcanos.
90  
Sir Joseph Banks, whose spidery web of correspondence touched almost every branch of 
early nineteenth-century natural history, encouraged the timorous Thomas Knight to 
publish his research on plant physiology.
91  Scientific patronage, then, reproduced some 
of the hierachical elements of the Academies, but in a looser and more effective way. 
 
The ability to control the allocation of positions was the critical element of 
scientific patronage.  Crosland documents how the creation of subordinate positions in 
teaching and research establishments in France provided promising young men with 
material means to finance their research.  There were also private subsidies.  Berthollet’s 
opening his laboratory facilities at his estate in Arcueil on the outskirts of Paris to 
promising chemists is perhaps the best example.  The crucial feature of these positions 
was that they remained in the giving of professional scientists with the ability to judge 
prospective scientific talent.  The number of apprenticeships, however, was small, 
limiting the number of qualified persons who could be so accommodated.
92  The growth 
of scientific specialization needed a broader institutional foundation.  In this respect the 
high degree of centralization in Paris, which had done so much to advance the 
prosecution of physical and natural sciences in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
century, was to prove less effective than the diffuse university system which grew up in 
Germany after the Reformation and the Thirty Years War to supply principalities with 
civil servants, priests, and medical specialists.  
 
Whereas the Paris assistantships were explicitly allocated to recruit and support  
talented young scientists, by a tradition inherited from medieval times universities in 
Germany permitted anyone possessing an appropriate degree to teach privately for fees. 
In mid-nineteenth-century Germany, the position of privat-dozent, which was unpaid but 
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  21gave access to the university library and laboratory facilities, played role similar to that of  
assistantships in the Grandes Écoles.  Dozents typically taught small specialized courses, 
the fee-rich general classes being monopolized by full professors.   The difference 
between the dozents and the French assistants was that the number of dozents was not 
restricted by the institution’s funding.  A dozent capable of attracting students could pay 
his own way.  The problem of quality control, however, remained.  In the course of the 
eighteenth century, titled professors, concerned that the growing popularity of tutorials 
given by dozents would eat into their fees, began to impose new examinations and the 
habilitationschrift as conditions for acceding to the dozentur.  Although the initial 
purpose was protectionist, its unintended consequence was to transform the dozentur 
from a modest self-employment into a specialized occupation geared to research in 
expectation of an ultimate appointment to the professoriat.
93  All this lay in the future. 
 
The biggest boost to expanding the basin of potential scientists came from growth 
in demand for science-based skills.  The expansion of scientific education in the first 
quarter of the nineteenth century reflected growing demand for a few well-defined 
specialties, such as military engineering, pharmacy, and medicine that required basic and 
in some instances advanced instruction in the relevant sciences.   Joint supply of skills 
possessing employment outside the research community reduced the risks attached to 
specialized scientific education, encouraging more young people to undertake it.  The 
ability to earn a living in pharmacy provided an insurance policy for somone investing in 
advanced education in chemistry and plant physiology.  The demand for scientific 
professionals thus shifted the derived demand for science teachers, providing a stable 
means of support that stimulated greater investment in advanced scientific skills.  This 
effect was reinforced by certification examinations imposed by the state for physicians, 
pharmacists, and teachers in state-financed gymnasia.  The need to prepare exams 
covering scientific material created a derived demand for courses and instructors, 
especially in Germany, where the exams governing eligibility to teach covered a 
sufficiently wide scientific area to generate a steady clientele for instructors in elementary 
science courses.
94  This development created positive feedbacks, as larger classes 
lowered the average cost of instruction, opening the possibility of a scientific career to a 
wider stratum of the population.  An increasing proportion of scientists after 1830 came 
from the lower middle classes, for whom scientific achievement provided one of the few 
contemporary vehicles for social advancement.. 
 
These obvious connections help to explain the sequence of institutionalization of 
the individual sciences.  On the basis of observational facility alone, one would expect 
the science of economic entomology and plant pathology to have developed before 
agricultural chemistry.  Chemistry, however, was a required course of study for aspiring 
pharmacists, and by the nineteenth century was already being exploited by manufacturers 
who encouraged its study.  Except for geologists for whom demand had economic 
support in mineral exploration, the sciences of natural history had few commercial uses.  
There were few job opportunities for mycologists and entomologists, though the rate of 
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  22publication accelerated there as elsewhere.
95  Entomologists were generally poor men 
who gained their living from a grab bag of poorly paid employments.
96  Mycology, too, 
was slighted and relegated to amateurs.  Only botany with its intimate link to the 
preparation of pharmaceutical simples had a strong base in institutionalized science. 
 
Hierarchies and Selection 
 
  New openings were not in and of themselves enough to sustain the expansion and 
proliferation of scientific work, because teaching positions were neither originally nor 
inherently research positions.  Professors published books, but most of the books were 
lecture notes, and although nomination to the highest scientific honours demanded 
original contributions, a satisfactory academic career could then as now be quietly 
pursued as long as the teacher stayed on the good side of his colleagues and the 
authorities.  Decentralized science conducted on a large scale required stronger incentives 
and stronger measures to ensure quality and productivity.  One means of encouraging 
sustained effort was the institution of ranks or grades, ascension the passage through 
which exposed a scientist to repeated screening.  In France the Institut was so organized, 
but once a member was admitted he could also progress through the ranks by longevity.  
In Germany the professorial hierarchy was well defined and strictly maintained, with two 
professorial ranks plus the untenured privatdozenten.  Above the local hierarchy stood 
another hierarchy of institutions, with the major metropolitan universities in Berlin, 
Munich and Leipzig attracting better students, more funding for research laboratories, 
and possessing greater prestige than the smaller provincial institutions.  By the 1820s 
Germany, then, with its professorial hierarchy and multiplicity of institutions possessed  
an institutional basis for continuous screening and promotion of scientific talent. 
 
  The critical element, however, was scientific control over research positions, and 
the imposition of scientific criteria for appointments and promotions.  Although their role 
as a repository of information and as the place of instruction in advanced studies made 
educational institutions likely venues for scientific research, the development of large-
scale university-based science was by no means inevitable.  One can imagine the 
scientific enterprise supported by sinecures, as had been the case in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth century, and to some degree remained the case in early nineteenth-century 
England.  The lack of original research in universities before 1800 and its thinness 
through much of the nineteenth century in local academies and technical schools is a 
warning against a too easy identification of higher learning with advanced scientific 
research.
97  In the eighteenth century, the greatest scientific achievements in universities 
outside philosophy were in the textual criticism of biblical sources, which inspired the 
first ‘graduate seminars’ in which students participated in the research of their professors.  
The classical seminar at Göttingen served as a model for Liebig’s laboratory at Giessen at 
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  23the end of the 1820s, which established the completion of an original piece of laboratory 
research as the criterion for a scientific Ph.D. 
 
    Turner’s account of the rise of university-based science in early nineteenth-
century Germany indicates that the critical events involved the seizure of academic 
appointments and promotions by peer groups constituting the then existing scientific 
community.
98  Paradoxically, the critical event handing control of appointments in 
scientific education to scientists was the Prussian government’s decision to remove 
responsibility for appointments and promotions from local professors and confide it to a 
larger community of scholars.  Down to the end of the Napoleonic Wars, German 
universities were parochial institutions whose internal affairs were managed somewhat 
like those of a private club.  Although excellence did not go unrewarded, what mattered 
was collegiality and what mattered even more was good connections.  Although they 
were in part funded by the state, like other sovereignties comprising the Holy Roman 
Empire, the universities were legally bound to a superior entity, but in practice quasi-
independent; and since the universities, like the states of which they formed a part, were 
divided along religious lines, the main item of contemporary contention before the rise of 
atheism was off the table.  Professors could thus engage in research, or spend their time 
teaching and writing works of scientific popularization.  It didn’t matter, because success 
in research yielded no differential reward, and indolence no penalty. 
 
  The break came with the Carlsbad Decrees in 1819. issued at Metternich’s 
command in response to the murder of a conservative writer by a deranged student.  The 
decree enjoined the states of the German Confederation to dissolve student associations 
(burschenchaften) and imposing censorship on university teachers.  The Decrees thus 
effectively put the German universities under trusteeship, ordering the member states to 
appoint curators to vet classes and public lectures in order to ascertain and encourage the 
political reliability of instructors.  As the bureaucrats extended their control over 
appointments, however, they found it useful to shield themselves against the charge of 
interfering in purely ‘academic affairs’ by drawing on the expertise of outsiders, thereby 
removing the power to appoint and promote from local professors who might be swayed 
by personal and parochial allegiances to hire political undesirables.
99  Subject to 
respecting the political constraint, it was inevitable that once the system was in place, 
academic scientists would impose scientific judgments on the respective merits of 
different candidates.  The vetting process also provided a means of placig their students 
in academic positions.  Thus, the decision to draw on expert opinion led to experts 
determining appointments.   
 
With this, the last element of the institutional form that could support the 
expansion of science through the second half of the twentieth century fell into place.  By 
the middle of the nineteenth century the central elements of scientific organization were 
all present: employment in universities and research institutions provided incomes 
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  24independent of results, thus providing insurance in what was otherwise an impossibly 
risky enterprise; networks of peer review overcame the moral hazard associated with that 
insurance; while a loose hierarchy of positions allocated by the scientists themselves 
provided a material incentive to do good science.   Much of course remained to be done.  
Probably the most important institutional innovation within the University was Justus 
Liebig’s teaching laboratory at Giessen, which served as a hothouse for training research 
chemists until his students were able to establish daughter institutions first in Germany 
and later throughout the world. 
 
  That the institutionalization of science in the universities was far from inevitable 
can be inferred from what happened in France, where control of the University, which 
was comprised of all secondary school teachers licensed by the state, was in the hands of 
a Grand Master who controlled their advancement.  Jules Simon writes of his experience 
as a teacher under the autocratic regime of Victor Cousin. noting that the Master 
personally presided over the aggrégation  (the competitive examination for teaching 
positions), determined where the aggrégés taught, and managed their careers.  Because 
university regulations guaranteed tenure, Cousin simply left chairs open and had them 
taught by chargés de cours, who performed all the duties of a full professor but received 
only that part of the salary that Cousin decided to give them.  Their position was 
precarious, as any deviation from Cousin’s philosophical party line could result in exile 
to the provinces.
100   Despite the size and excellence of the French scientific 
establishment concentrated in Paris and perhaps because of it, the provincial universities 
in France never achieved the scientific prominence of provincial universities in Germany.  
Within the narrow confines of the Grandes Écoles and the great Parisian research 
establishment at Jussieu, the selection of scientists was rigorous and effective.  But the 




  By the middle of the nineteenth century a system of decentralized science much 
like the one we know today was in place.  One sign of its robustness was the speed at 
which agricultural experiment stations transformed themselves into quasi-academic 
associations with tight links to the universities.  The first station was founded in 1850 in 
Mockern, Saxony.  By the early 1860s Germany had more than a dozen of them, and in 
1862 they had formed an association supporting two ‘academic’ journals and holding 
annual meetings at which researchers presented their research.  All this in the science of 
fertilizer analysis and bovine respiration.  Successful researchers moved to larger 
research stations and eventually obtained professorships in universities.  The incentive 
system perhaps played against purely practical demands for farmers for information on 
optimal feeding formulas for dairy cattle, but it is hard to see what other kind of 
organization would have sustained the research that produced the discovery that bacteria 
living in symbiosis with the roots of legumes were the primary source of nitrogen in the 
soil.    
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  25  The emergence of this system reflected the intersection of several distinct strands 
of historical development that might have crossed in ways resulting in distinctly different 
outcomes.  Institutionalized science of the type that emerged in the middle of the 
seventeenth century would undoubtedly have survived, along with the aristocratic science 
that sustained geology and natural history.  But what is one to make of the less 
prestigious branches of enquiry that required much rote work of the kind eventually 
carried out by research assistants in provincial universities, or the mind-numbing 
experiments recorded in the papers of nineteenth-century agricultural experiment 
stations?  The institutions of higher learning supplied an exceptionally rich soil in which 
science could take root and flourish.  They created small societies in which ambition and 
success could be rewarded at relatively low cost to the outside world.  That life, which in 
many ways (though not all) was idyllic, may be coming to an end.  It was good while it 
lasted. 
 
 
 
  26